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The Jurisprudence of Pleading:
Rights, Rules, and Conley v. Gibson
EMILY SHERWIN*

For fifty years, Conley v. Gibson1 stood as the landmark decision
on pleading under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (the "Rules"),
establishing that a complaint is sufficient to initiate a lawsuit if it gives
fair notice of the plaintiff's claim. Before Conley, pleading played a
vital role in sustaining and shaping legal actions. The Supreme
Court's decision in Conley greatly reduced both the strategic importance of pleading and the influence of pleading on the subsequent trial
and decision of claims.
The Court stated in Conley that:
[A] complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim
unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of
facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief ....
[A]II the Rules require is a 'short and plain statement of the claim'
that will give the defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff's claim is
and the grounds upon which it rests. 2
The Court also remarked that "the purpose of pleading is to facilitate
a proper decision on the merits." 3
Most commentary on Conley has focused on the extent to which
plaintiffs must marshal factual support for their claims at the pleading
stage of litigation, prior to discovery. The consensus is that Conley
* Professor, Cornell Law School. Thanks very much to Kevin Clermont for help and
advice, and to Jill McCormack for excellent research assistance.
1. 355 U.S. 41 (1957).
2. Id. at 45-46, 47.
3. Id. at 48.
4. See, e.g., 2 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE T 8.04 (2008)
[hereinafter MOORE'S] (discussing the degree of factual detail required by Rule 8 and stating
that plaintiffs are not required to plead the elements of a legal claim); 5 CHARLES ALAN
WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1202, at 92-97 (3d ed.
2004) [hereinafter WRIGHT & MILLER] (discussing the generality of pleadings); Christopher M.
Fairman, Heightened Pleading, 81 TEX. L. REV. 551 (2002) (opposing heightened pleading standards); Christopher M. Fairman, The Myth of Notice Pleading, 45 ARIz. L. REV. 987 (2003)
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requires very little specificity,' and most observers have endorsed the
minimal standard set out in Conley. Supporters of Conley maintain

that requiring extensive factual allegations before discovery is unfair
to plaintiffs who may lack access to information in defendants' control, and that doubts about the factual foundation of a case can be

adequately explored later in the process through mechanisms such as
summary judgment and pretrial consultation.6 Criticism of the Conley
standard typically refers to the costs of discovery and the possibility
that defendants will be forced to settle factually weak claims in order
to avoid the expense of litigation.7 In several recent decisions, the

Supreme Court has rejected the specific pronouncements made in
Conley; these new decisions also address the problem of how much
factual foundation plaintiffs can fairly be required to provide at the
8
pleading stage of litigation.

When Conley v. Gibson was decided in 1957, a different sort of
pleading debate was under way. The judges and academics who argued over pleading standards in 1957 were interested not only in the
(discussing lower federal courts' imposition of heightened pleading standards requiring greater
factual specificity in particular types of cases, contrary to the Supreme Court's interpretation of
Rule 8 in Conley).
A possible exception is Richard L. Marcus, The Puzzling Persistenceof PleadingPractice, 76
TEX. L. REV. 1749, 1755-59 (1998) (suggesting that pleading rules should be analyzed in terms of
their capacity to facilitate early decisions on the merits); Richard L. Marcus, The Revival of Fact
Pleading Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 433, 459-65 (1986)
(suggesting that issue-oriented pleading can sometimes facilitate decisions on the merits).
5. Wright and Miller comment that it is very hard for counsel to draft a defective complaint under the standard of Conley. WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 4, at 97.
6. See, e.g., MOORE'S, supra note 4 (approving minimal pleading requirements and discussing alternative means for screening claims); WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 4, at 89, 98; Fairman,
Heightened Pleading,supra note 4, at 593-96; Fairman, The Myth of Notice Pleading,supra note
4, at 993-94; Editorial, The Devil in the Details, 91 JUDICATURE 51, 52 (2007) (citing the American ideal of access to courts); see also RICHARD A. FIELD, BENJAMIN KAPLAN & KEVIN M.
CLERMONT, MATERIALS FOR A BASIC COURSE IN CIVIL PROCEDURE 1150-52 (9th ed. 2007)
(proposing an amendment of the Rules to eliminate motions to dismiss for defective pleading).
7. See, e.g., Bell Atd. Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1966 (2007) (citing expense and
abuse of discovery); Dura Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 347 (2005) (citing delay and
abuse of discovery); Richard A. Epstein, Bell Atlantic v. Twombly: How Motions to Dismiss
Become (Disguised) Summary Judgments, UNIV. OF CHI. LAW & ECON., Olin Working Paper No.

403, 2008, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1126359 (suggesting that the pleading provisions
of the Federal Rules are not well suited to modern complex litigation); Fairman, The Myth of
Notice Pleading, supra note 4, at 1059 (explaining the reasoning of courts that have imposed
heightened pleading standards).
8. The Court rejected the "no set of facts" language of Conley and appeared to impose a
new requirement of plausibility in pleadings. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. 1955. Two weeks later, in
Erickson v. Pardus,127 S. Ct. 2197 (2007), the court reversed the dismissal of a civil rights complaint against prison officials, with no mention of plausibility. The implications of these cases
remain in doubt; in each case, however, the focus was on the specificity and plausibility of factual
allegations in complaints.
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extent to which plaintiffs must plead facts, but also in the extent to
which their complaints must identify the legal issues in dispute. In
other words, should the rules of pleading require plaintiffs to provide
the court with a theory of recovery according to established or proposed rules of law? Or, alternatively, should procedural rules encourage plaintiffs to lay their stories before the court without
reference to fixed categories of legal claims and allow judges to adjudicate in response, as the facts require?
These questions, which track more general choices between deference to precedent rules on one side and judicial discretion and particularistic justice on the other, are significant for anyone concerned
with development and enforcement of civil rights. Expansion of civil
rights may depend on judicial imagination; at the same time, judicial
imagination without the constraint of rules can veer in directions that
disfavor or distort civil rights. Today, the notion of issue pleading has
been relegated to history: no one maintains that plaintiffs must specify
the elements of a legal cause of action in their complaints. 9 Nevertheless, the procedural debates that preceded Conley are worthy of attention, if only to understand the path not taken.
In this article, I offer a short intellectual history of Conley and the
pleading debates that took place at the time of the decision. I also
describe the Conley decision itself, which the Court appears to have
made in haste and without close consideration of the interpretive
questions at stake or their broader jurisprudential implications. Finally, I comment briefly on the relationship between the procedural
questions under debate at the time of Conley and enforcement of civil
rights. That relationship, however, is far too complex for me to address systematically; my principal objective is simply to provide a historical footnote to the subject.1 0

9. See Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 510 (2002) (holding that plaintiffs are
not required to plead the elements of a legal claim: "The prima facie case ... is an evidentiary
standard, not a pleading requirement."). But cf. Max Huffman, The Necessity of Pleading Elements in PrivateAntitrust Conspiracy Claims, 10 U. PA. J. Bus. & EMP. L. 627, 634, 636-40 (2008)
(suggesting that Rule 8 implies a "demonstration" requirement, such that plaintiffs must plead
facts establishing the elements of a right of recovery, and that Conley should not be read to
override this requirement). Huffman's commentary is particularly directed toward antitrust
actions.
10. See Kenneth W. Mack, Rethinking Civil Rights Lawyering and Politics in the Era Before
Brown, 115 YALE L.J. 256 (2005) (suggesting that a legal liberal model of social change through
rights-based litigation does not capture the complex and variable theories that motivated civil
rights lawyers in the first half of the twentieth century).
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I.
A.

THE BACKGROUND

Rule 8 and Its Antecedents

Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, adopted in 1938,
requires "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the
pleader is entitled to relief."'" Rule 8 was designed to make a significant break from pleading rules of the past. At least as interpreted in
Conley v. Gibson, it accomplished its goal.
In the early days of English law, lawsuits began in Chancery and
then proceeded to Westminster Hall in London, where lawyers
pleaded their claims and defenses before the justices of the royal
courts.' 2 The object of this initial stage of litigation was to identify an
issue of fact for decision by a jury sitting in the locality where the
claim arose. At the time, there was no appellate process as we know
it; instead, rules of law were proposed, discussed, and approved or
disapproved at the level of pleading.1 3 In the medieval period, pleading appears to have been a vibrant process that shaped the evolving
body of law.' 4 By the sixteenth century, however, pleading practices
were fixed and formal, serving only to screen out unorthodox cases
and determine the mode of trial within the categories established by
15
the common-law forms of action.
The first comprehensive procedural reform in the United States
was the Field Code, which was enacted (in large part) in New York in
1848.16 The Field Code merged law and equity, abolished the common law forms of action, and greatly loosened procedural constraints
on legal claims. To initiate a civil action under the Field Code, plaintiffs were required to submit a "plain and concise statement of the
facts constituting a cause of action without unnecessary repetition."1 7
11. FED. R. Civ. P. 8(a).
12. On early English pleading practices, see generally, J.H. BAKER, AN INTRODUCTION TO
ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY 20-22, 53-57, 76-79, 86-90 (4th ed. 2002). By the 1500's, the ordeals of
early medieval law had fallen out of use, but older writs might still require proof by oath. Trespass actions, in contrast, were tried by juries. See id. at 72-76.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. On the history of the Field Code, see generally, CHARLES E. CLARK, HANDBOOK OF
THE LAW OF CODE PLEADING 21-31 (2d ed. 1947) [hereinafter CLARK, CODE PLEADING]; FIELD,
KAPLAN & CLERMONT, supra note 6, at 1106-10; see also Robert G. Bone, Mapping the Boundaries of a Dispute: Conceptions of the Ideal Lawsuit Structure from the Field Code to the Federal

Rules, 89 COLUM. L.

REV. 1,

5-26 (1989) (sketching an intellectual history of the Field Code

reforms); Stephen N. Subrin, How Equity Conquered Common Law: The Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure in Historical Perspective. 135 U. PA. L. REV. 909, 931-39 (1987).
17.

1848 N.Y. Field Code Laws ch. 379, § 142, amended by ch. 438 (1949).
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The Field Code was intended to work a radical change in pleading practices. Disputes soon arose, however, over what causes of action were entailed in particular suits, what facts were necessary to
make out the relevant causes of action, and how much factual detail
must be included in a complaint. In response, lawyers and courts continued to cite precedents decided under the common-law forms of
18
action.
The Field Code's failure to simplify civil procedure, particularly
in the area of pleading, led to calls for further change. 19 Reformers
persuaded Congress to enact the Rules Enabling Act in 1934,20 and in
1938 the Supreme Court promulgated the Rules. Rule 8 addressed
the problems of Code pleading by omitting any reference to the plaintiff's "cause of action."
In his classic article on the history of American civil procedure,
Stephen Subrin characterizes the Rules, and particularly the pleading
standard announced in Rule 8, as a triumph of equity practice over the
common law."1 The Rules adopted many of the procedures used by
the former courts of equity and, more generally, an equitable approach to adjudication. The guiding principle of the Rules was that
adjudication should not be hampered by procedural technicalities:
parties should be free to present their versions of disputed events to
the court and judges should have broad discretion to reach just outcomes." Rule 8, as interpreted in Conley, exemplifies the equitable
character of the rules.
In Subrin's view, the shift from common law practice to equity
practice went too far. The decisional leeway associated with equity is
conducive to the creation of new rights, but equity works best in tandem with a set of concrete legal rules. A legal system that relies too
heavily on the equitable model of adjudication lacks the discipline
needed to enforce rights effectively.2
18. See CLARK, CODE PLEADING, supra note 16, 225-32 & 247-52 (discussing problems of
Code pleading and reliance on common law precedents); FIELD, KAPLAN & CLERMONT, supra
note 4, at 1147-48 (discussing Code pleading); Bone, supra note 13, at 28-39 (discussing differing
conceptions of a cause of action). See infra pp. 105-08, 110, 112 and notes 22, 25, 35-37, 46 & 63.
19. See Subrin, supra note 16, at 943-73 (recounting the history of the reform movement
that led to the Federal Rules).
20. The Rules Enabling Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-415, ch. 651, 48 Stat. 1064 (current
version at 28 U.S.C. §§ 2071-2077 (1994)).
21. Subrin, supra note 16.
22. See id. at 973; CLARK, CODE PLEADING, supra note 16, at 54; Charles E. Clark, The
Handmaid of Justice, 23 WASH. U. L. Q. 297 (1938).
23. See Subrin, supra note 16, at 913, 1000-02.
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B.

Legal Positivism, Legal Realism, and the Procedural Debates
Preceding Conley v. Gibson

The pleading debate that took place in the first half of the twentieth century-the debate that ended with Conley v. Gibson-began as
an argument over the meaning of the term "cause of action" in the
various state procedural codes derived from the Field Code. As
noted, the Code provision governing complaints required a statement
of "facts constituting a cause of action." 24 Other provisions of the
Code, including joinder provisions, also referred to the plaintiff's
cause of action.2 5
Traditional interpretations equated a cause of action with a legal
right or, in the Hohfeldian terminology of the day, a "right-duty relation."'26 John Norton Pomeroy's treatise on Code practice, for example, defined a cause of action as "the facts from which the plaintiff's
primary right and the defendant's corresponding primary duty have
arisen, together with the facts which constitute the defendant's delict
or act of wrong. '27 The terms "right," "duty," and "delict" are not
explained, but their content evidently depended on the governing
rules of substantive law, independent of the Code.2" For pleading purposes, Pomeroy's formulation of a cause of action may be broad
enough to allow for a novel interpretation or extension of existing
substantive rules. At the least, however, it requires a pleader to have
a legal theory in mind at the outset of the case.
Among twentieth century commentators, Oliver McCaskill, a
professor at Cornell and other law schools, proposed the narrowest
definition of a cause of action. McCaskill was a staunch defender of
traditional pleading practices for more than twenty-five years, before
24. 1848 N.Y. Field Code Laws ch. 379, § 142.
25. See CLARK, CODE PLEADING, supra note 16, at 127-28 & n.135.
26. See generally Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in

Judicial Reasoning, 26 YALE L.J. 710 (1917).
27. JOHN NORTON POMEROY, CODE REMEDIES: REMEDIES AND REMEDIAL RIGHTS BY THE
CIVIL ActiON 528, 554-56 (Walter Carrington, ed., Little, Brown & Co. 5th ed. 1929) [hereinafter POMEROY, 5th ed.]; JOHN NORTON POMEROY, CODE REMEDIES: REMEDIES AND REMEDIAL
RIGHTS BY THE CIVIL AcrlON 461 (Thomas A. Bogle, ed., Little Brown & Co. 4th ed. 1904)
[hereinafter POMEROY, 4th ed.].

28. Pomeroy and his later editors conceived of the common law, which defined primary
rights and duties as a body of principles independent of individual judges. Accordingly, they
maintained that although the Code had abolished the forms of action, the elements of a cause of
action remained immutable. See POMEROY, 5th ed., supra note 27, at 45-47, 74-79 (discussing the
substantive content of a cause of action).
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and after the adoption of the Federal Rules.2 9 McCaskill argued that
the scope of a cause of action depends on the historical antecedents of
the plaintiff's claim to relief. According to McCaskill, a cause of action is:
[T]hat group of operative facts which, standing alone, would show a
single right of action in the plaintiff and a single delict to that right
....

The singleness of the right and delict is determined by a study

of the old remedies in connection with which the concepts as to singleness of rights and delicts developed.3"
Thus, McCaskill's definition linked the notion of a cause of action not
only to substantive rules of law, but to the common law forms of action and the remedies they afforded for particular wrongs.3"
Although the more traditional conceptions of a cause of action
did not all send pleaders back to the forms of action, they had in common a close connection among pleading, adjudication, and positive
rules of law.32 A complaint must set out a cause of action, meaning
facts that correspond to a legal right. Accordingly, a viable lawsuit
must invoke and conform to a plausible interpretation of law from its
inception.
The opposing view of the matter was stated most often and forcefully by Charles Clark, Dean of the Yale Law School and later a judge
on Second Circuit Court of Appeals. Clark was a specialist in plead-

29. McCaskill voiced his objections to Charles Clark's approach to pleading as early as
1925. See O.L. McCaskill, Actions and Causes of Action, 34 YALE L.J. 614, 638 (1925) [hereinafter McCaskill, Actions]. In 1952, McCaskill, now teaching at the Hastings College of Law, participated in a Ninth Circuit judicial conference which culminated in a recommendation to amend
Rule 8 to require "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to
relief, which statement shall contain the facts constituting a cause of action." O.L. McCaskill,
Claim or Cause of Action: A Discussion on the Need for Amendment of Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a) (2) of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 13 F.R.D. 253, 253, 271-73 (1952) [hereinafter McCaskill,
Claim or Cause of Action] (emphasis added). Other examples of McCaskill's writing on the
subject include O.L. McCaskill, Easy Pleading, 35 ILL. L. REV. Nw. U. 28 (1940) [hereinafter
McCaskill, Easy Pleading]; Oliver L. McCaskill, The Elusive Cause of Action, 4 U. CHI. L. REV.
281 (1936); O.L. McCaskill, The Modern Philosophy of Pleading:A Dialogue Outside the Shades,
38 A.B.A. J. 123 (1952) [hereinafter McCaskill, Modern Philosophy].
30. See McCaskill, Actions, supra note 29, at 638.
31. McCaskill viewed Pomeroy's definition as dangerously loose. See McCaskill, Easy
Pleading, supra note 29, at 33 ("Pomeroy seems to have been the first writer of prominence to
give impetus to the new deal for poor pleaders.").
32. Dean Bernard Gavit of the Indiana University School of Law made this connection
explicitly: "The theory has been that a plaintiff comes into court seeking recognition of an 'existing' right .... Whether [the plaintiff's allegations] are sufficient for that purpose is a question
not of pleading but of substantive law." Bernard C. Gavit, A "Pragmatic Definition" of the
"Cause of Action?", 82 U. PA. L. REV. 129, 145 (1933).
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ing, and the principal draftsman of the Federal Rules. 33 He was also a
leading figure in the American Legal Realist movement.3 4
Clark defined a cause of action (as used in the Field Code) as
"such an aggregate of operative facts as will give rise to at least one
right of action."'35 At first, this definition may sound similar to the
standard right-based definition set out in Pomeroy's treatise. For
Clark, however, the emphasis was on facts rather than law: the essence of a cause of action was not a legal right but a set of facts that
might ultimately generate one or more legal rights.3 6 Clark went on to
say that "the extent of the cause is to be determined pragmatically by
the court, having in mind the facts and circumstances of the case...
the controlling factor will be the matter of trial convenience, for that is
the general purpose to be subserved by these procedural rules. '37 In
other words, the contours of a cause of action do not depend on governing law, but on practical considerations, assessed in light of the underlying objective of full and fair investigation of the parties' dispute.
Clark's conception of a cause of action reflected his Legal Realist
approach to law and legal procedure.3 8 During the 1930s, under
Clark's leadership, the Yale Law School was the hub of American Legal Realism. 39 Legal Realism began with the premise that legal rules
33. See generally STEPHEN N. SUBRIN, Charles E. Clark and His Procedural Outlook, in
JUDGE CHARLES EDWARD CLARK 115, 141 (Peninah Petruck, ed., 1991) (suggesting that Clark
believed procedure to be an instrument that could serve as the means to serve new social needs).
34. See generally Myres S. McDougal, Reminiscence of Charles Edward Clark, in JUDGE
CHARLES EDWARD CLARK, supra note 33, at 171. But cf. Bone, supra note 16, at 81-89 (characterizing Clark as a pragmatist).
35.

CLARK, CODE PLEADING,

supra note 16, at 137.

36. See id. at 143 ("The essential thing is that there be chosen a factual unit, whose limits
are determined by the time and sequence and unity of the happenings, rather than by some
vague guess or prophecy of potential judicial action."); see also Dioguardi v. Durning, 139 F.2d
774 (2d Cir. 1944) (establishing that Clark was concerned only with the potential capacity of the
facts to generate a right, and not with whether they established a right under existing rules of
law). See infra, text at notes 66-69.
37. CLARK, CODE PLEADING, supra note 16, at 137.
38. For helpful discussions of Legal Realism, see for example, LAURA KALMAN, LEGAL
REALISM AT YALE: 1927-1960 3-44 (University of North Carolina Press 1986); Brian Leiter,
American Legal Realism, in
ORY

THE BLACKWELL GUIDE TO PHILOSOPHY OF LAW AND LEGAL THE-

50 (Martin P. Golding & William A. Edmundson eds., 2005) [hereinafter Leiter,

LEGAL REALISM]; BRIAN LEITER, NATURALIZING JURISPRUDENCE:

GAL REALISM AND NATURALISM IN LEGAL PHILOSOPHY
URALIZING

JURISPRUDENCE];

ANTHONY

J.

JURISPRUDENCE 75-83, 104-06 (1998); Anthony
alism, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 335 (1987).

SEBOK,

21-30 (2007) [hereinafter
LEGAL

AMERICAN

ESSAYS ON AMERICAN

POSITIVISM

IN

LE-

LEITER, NATAMERICAN

Kronman, JurisprudentialResponses to Legal Re-

39. See KALMAN, supra note 38, at 115-20. Kalman relates that Legal Realism lost momentum at Yale in the later 1930s (during Clark's second decanal term), due to financial difficulties,
friction between Clark and the university administration, and theoretical disarray within the Legal Realist movement. Id. at 120-40. Clark left Yale for the Second Circuit in 1939. Id. at 140.
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do not determine the outcome of adjudication: the abstract rules and
constructs traditionally associated with law are too malleable and too
far removed from the factual context of legal disputes to constrain
judicial decision-making.4 0 The important question, therefore, is how
judges resolve disputes, or should resolve disputes, in the absence of
effective rules. Answers diverged: some Legal Realists maintained
that judicial decisions are constrained by judges' training, experience,
and professional ethos; others took the more skeptical view that judicial decisions are a function of the personal values and psychological
predilections of individual judges.4 1

The point of agreement among Legal Realists was the incapacity
of positive law to dictate legal results: judges were active players in the
process of adjudication, not passive conduits for a body of substantive
legal rules. For the Legal Realists, however, this was not necessarily a
reason for cynicism or regret. The challenge for law and legal theory,
as they saw it, was to eliminate abstractions in favor of a more "scien-

tific" approach to adjudication, in which judges combine particular
facts and social imperatives to achieve a just result.4 2 In general, despite their belief that judges were unconstrained by positive law, Legal
Realists had faith in the wisdom and fairness of judges.4 3
Not all Legal Realists were opposed to the use of rules to guide
decisions, if the rules themselves were sensitive to context and social

40. See, e.g., KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH: ON OUR LAW AND ITS STUDY 7275 (1960) (arguing that precedents are manipulable); see generally KALMAN, supra note 38, at 310; Leiter, AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM, supra note 38, at 52-53; LEITER, NATURALIZING JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 38, at 21-25; SEBOK, supra note 38, at 104-05.
41. See LEITER, NATURALIZING JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 38, at 25-26, 28-29 (distinguishing the "Sociological Wing" of Legal Realism from the "Idiosyncrasy Wing"); Leiter, AMERICAN
LEGAL REALISM, supra note 38, at 54-56.
42. See KALMAN, supra note 38, at 30-35 (discussing ventures by Clark and other Legal
Realists into empirical studies of law); LEITER, NATURALIZING JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 38,
at 31-46 (characterizing Legal Realism as a "naturalized" theory of adjudication, treating legal
decision-making as continuous with social science); Kronman, supra note 38, at 336-39 (discussing the "scientific branch" of Legal Realism).
43. See, e.g., KALMAN, supra note 38, at 21 (noting the enthusiasm of Legal Realists for
judicial discretion); Charles E. Clark & David M. Trubeck, The Creative Role of the Judge: Restraint and Freedom in the Common Tradition, 71 YALE L.J. 255 (1961) (expressing confidence in
judicial decision making). For an extreme example of belief in the ability of judges to reach just
decisions, see Joseph C. Hutcheson, Jr., The Judgment Intuitive: The Function of the "Hunch" in
JudicialDecision, 14 CORNELL L. Q. 274 (1928). To give just one example, Hutcheson (himself a
judge) said that "judicial intuitions, and the opinions lighted and warmed by the feeling which
produced them,... not only give justice in the cause, but like a great white way, make plain in
the wilderness the way of the Lord for judicial feet to follow." Id. at 287-88.
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reality.4 4 Karl Llewellyn, for example, designed the Uniform Commercial Code, and Charles Clark masterminded the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure. Yet, the central premise of Legal Realism-that
judges are not constrained by rules-implied that rules could only operate as guides to decision, not reasons for decision. For Legal Realists, therefore, sound rules were responsive to variations among the
cases they govern and permeable to the ends they were designed to
achieve.4a
Clark aimed to carry out Legal Realist insights through the medium of procedural reform. The purpose of pleading, and of procedural rules generally, was to facilitate unrestricted judicial investigation
of the parties' dispute, without the distraction of a preconceived theory of legal right and wrong. 46 Like many Legal Realists, Clark also
had confidence in the ability of judges to manage trials fairly and resolve disputes justly.47 Accordingly, his definition of a "cause of action" was, in a sense, no definition. A cause of action was whatever
set of factual allegations gave notice to the defendant of the genesis of
the plaintiff's claim and allowed the presiding judge to organize a fair
hearing of the case. 48 The same standard, without the potentially misleading term "cause of action," was incorporated into the Federal
Rules.
Oliver McCaskill, who was not a friend of Legal Realism, argued
that Clark's definition of a cause of action imposed no constraint at all
on the discretion of judges. "Operative facts and legal relations [are]
intertwined [in Clark's definition], with the net result that it means
what the person using the term makes it mean, and each trial judge,
guided only by the principle of administrative convenience, shapes the
cause of action to meet his own ideas."' 49 Another critic, Dean Bernard Gavit of the Indiana University School of Law, tied his opposition more explicitly to the question of adherence to positive law.
Gavit defended the utility of formal rules, arguing that in a field such
44. See Leiter, AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM, supra note 38, at 53, 56 (discussing Legal Realist efforts to redesign legal rules); LEITER, NATURALIZING JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 38, at 30

(discussing proposals for fact-specific rules or rules making reference to external norms).
45. See, e.g., LLEWELLYN, supra note 40, at 159 (discussing precedents as guides to decision
in analogous types of situations); Herman Oliphant, A Return to Stare Decisis, 14 A.B.A. J. 71
(1928) (advocating an "empirical" form of stare decisis).
46. See CLARK, supra note 16; SUBRIN, supra note 33, at 141.
47. See McDougal, supra note 34, at 176-77 (describing Clark's faith in judges); SUBRIN,
supra note 33, at 143; Clark & Trubeck, supra note 43 (favoring judicial freedom).
48. See supra text accompanying notes 35-37.

49. See McCaskill, Actions, supra note 29, at 619.
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as law, which is concerned with regulation of human conduct, abstract
classifications and preexisting definitions of right and wrong are necessary for rational discourse and decision.5" Clark's definition of a
cause of action was an "ex post facto" definition, which contributed
nothing and was not the meaning intended by the drafters of the
Code.5 1 In Gavit's view, the Code's pleading rules required the plaintiff to state "facts showing the existence of some legal right ....
Whether [the facts stated] are sufficient for that purpose is a question
not of pleading but of substantive law." 5 2
Thus, the early twentieth century debate over pleading was, at
least in part, a jurisprudential debate, waged between legal formalists
and Legal Realists. The theoretical divide occurred at two levels.
First, formalists and Realists disagreed about the form of the pleading
rule itself: should the meaning of a cause of action (and, accordingly,
the requirements for a successful complaint) be fixed in advance or
determined "pragmatically" by the trial judge, in the context of each
proffered suit?5 3 Second, and more importantly, the different interpretations formalists and Realists gave to the Code's pleading rules
reflected their differing views of the role of positive law in adjudication. The interpretation pressed by Clark's opponents made the plaintiff's cause of action dependent on supporting rules of substantive law,
thereby increasing the chances that the course of litigation, and the
resolution of litigated disputes, would be governed by consistent legal
rules. Clark's interpretation of a cause of action loosened the grip of
substantive law on trials, favoring instead a mode of adjudication in
which judges aimed for just outcomes, case-by-case.54
In this respect, the pre-Conley debate was quite different from
modern discussions of pleading, which center on the sufficiency of factual support for the plaintiff's claim. The Supreme Court's recent de50. See Gavit, supra note 32, at 139-43 ("Mental images are all concepts ....
[o]ne who
wishes to escape concepts must remain unborn.").
51. Id. at 143-44.
52. Id. at 145.
53. Compare CLARK, supra note 16, at 137 (recommending that courts should define causes
of action "pragmatically"), with Gavit, supra note 32, at 143-44 (arguing that a useful legal definition must operate prospectively).
54. Compare Charles E. Clark, The Cause of Action, 82 U. PA. L. REv. 354, 361 (1934)
(suggesting that his definition of a cause of action was consistent with "[Tihe logical progression
of ideas which first considers the operative facts, that is the actual acts or events which have
happened, and from these draws conclusions as to the legal rights which the courts will enforce."), with Gavit, supra note 32, at 145 (maintaining a distinction between procedural and
substantive law and stating that whether a complaint states a cause of action is "[a] question not
of pleading but of substantive law.").
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cision in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly,5 5 in which the Court
suggested that the plaintiff must plead a "plausible" claim, has
sparked a renewed discussion of what groundwork a plaintiff must lay
to begin a suit.56 Commentators have assumed, however, that the
plausibility of a claim is a question of factual rather than legal sufficiency. Accordingly, their arguments have weighed plaintiffs' interest

in access to the courts against the costs to defendants and society of
allowing plaintiffs to initiate lawsuits in order to "fish" for facts that
might support a claim (or to obtain nuisance settlements in the ab57
sence of supporting facts).
In contrast, the early debate over the meaning and necessity of a
"cause of action" was primarily a debate about whether plaintiffs
should be permitted to fish for law. Charles Clark believed that a
plaintiff with a compelling story should be able to bring it before a

judge and ask for justice.58 Clark's opponents believed that courts
should screen claims at the pleading stage to determine whether they
fit within an existing rule of substantive law, or a plausible elaboration

of existing law. 59 The current debate may be of greater practical significance, insofar as it determines the movement of large sums of
money. From a jurisprudential point of view, however, the important
debate was the older debate, which linked pleading to the fundamental question of how active a role judges should play in constructing,
extending, and revising substantive law.
Although the promulgation of Rule 8 was a victory for Clark and
Legal Realism, it did not end the debate over pleading. In the years

preceding Conley, O.L. McCaskill and others continued to argue either that the reference in Rule 8 to a statement "showing that the
55. 127 S. Ct. 1955 (2007). See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
56. See, e.g., A. Benjamin Spencer, Plausibility Pleading, 49 B.C. L. REV. 431 (2008) (discussing the meaning of plausibility); Ettie Ward, The Future of Pleading in the Federal System
Debating the Impact of Bell Atlantic v. Twombly: The After-Shocks of Twombly: Will We "Notice" Pleading Changes?, 82 ST. JOHN's L. REV. 893 (2008) (discussing the meaning of plausibility); Lonny S. Hoffman, Burn Up the Chaff with Unquenchable Fire: What Two Doctrinal
Intersections Can Teach Us About JudicialPower Over Pleadings,http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfmabstract id=1097895 (forthcoming 2008); see also Kendall W. Hannon, Much Ado
About Twombly? A Study on the Impact of Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly on 12(b)(6) Motions,
83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1811 (2008) (discussing plausibility and offering data on outcomes of
motions to dismiss in cases after Twombly).
57. See Hoffman, supra note 56, at 1, 5, 14-17; Spencer, supra note 56, at 479-89; cf.Marcus,
supra note 4, at 434 (referring to "fishing expeditions" under the standard of Conley). For a
critical examination of the term "fishing expedition," see Elizabeth G. Thornburg, Just Say "No
Fishing": The Lure of Metaphor, 40 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 1 (2006).
58. See supra text accompanying notes 35-48.
59. See supra text accompanying notes 49-52.
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pleader is entitled to relief" implied that a complaint must set forth a
legally defined theory of right, or that the Rule should be amended to
require a statement of facts "constituting a cause of action."6 ° Again,
the discussions focused not on the necessary factual foundation for a
viable claim, but on the need to delineate legal issues in order to constrain both the scope of trials and the discretion of judges. For example, at a conference convened in the Ninth Circuit to discuss the
possibility of amending Rule 8, one McCaskill supporter argued that

under Clark's approach to pleading, "you find judicial imagination injecting all possible questions that are not there."' 6 ' Another critic suggested that under Rule 8, as designed by Clark, "the judge, and not
6
the parties, picks the questions to be decided.
Commentators on both sides of the continuing debate drew a distinction between "notice" pleading and pleading issues. According to
Clark, the purpose of a complaint was to give notice of "the general
nature of the case and the circumstances and events on which it is
based., 63 In the view of his opponents, a complaint should also define
and narrow the legal issues in dispute. 64 Again, the underlying disagreement concerned the degree to which adjudication should conform
to positive law. Today, notice pleading is more often contrasted with
"fact" pleading, or "Code" pleading, which entails a more specific
60. See McCaskill, Claim or Cause of Action, supra note 29; McCaskill, Easy Pleading,
supra note 29; McCaskill, Modern Philosophy, supra note 29.
61. McCaskill, Claim or Cause of Action, supra note 29, at 269 (memorandum of Moses
Lasky).
62. James Alger Fee, The Lost Horizon in Pleading Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 48 COLUM. L. REV. 491, 494 (1948).

63. Charles E. Clark, Simplified Pleading, 2 F.R.D. 456, 460-61 (1942); see CLARK, CODE
supra note 16, at 56-58 (discussing the purposes of pleading); James A. Pike & John
W. Willis, The New FederalDeposition-DiscoveryProcedure:1, 38 COLUM. L. REV. 1179, 1179-80
(1938) (writing in support of notice pleading). Clark himself sometimes resisted the term "notice
pleading," claiming that Rule 8 required more than a bare notification of a legal claim and that a
general statement of the circumstances under dispute was enough to apprise the parties and an
experienced judge of the issues inthe case. See, e.g., Charles E. Clark, Comment on Judge Dawson's Paper on the Place the Pleadingin the ProperDefinition of the Issues in the "Big Case", 23
F.R.D. 319, 435-38 (1958); see also Clark, Simplified Pleading,supra, at 456-62 (elaborating on
the concept of notice).
64. See, e.g., Archie 0. Dawson, The Place of Pleading in the Property Definition of Issues
in the "Big Case", 23 F.R.D. 430, 432, 434-45 (1958) ("[M]ost trial judges have come to the
realization that the notice theory of pleading does not result in a delineation of issues sufficient
to enable the trial judges to pass on the questions which arise with reference to discovery, particularly in the big case."); McCaskill, Easy Pleading,supra note 29, at 35, 38 (distinguishing pleading designed to identify legal issues from pleading designed to give notice, or "transaction"
pleading, which he characterized as "communistic"); McCaskill, Modern Philosophy, supra note
29, at 123 (stating, with disapproval, that under Clark's approach, pleadings "have the function
only of giving fair notice" and "make no attempt to form issues").
PLEADING,
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statement of facts.6 5 Prior to Conley, however, the critical question
was not specificity, but the degree to which complaints, and more generally litigation, should conform to positive law.
The difference between notice pleading and issue-oriented pleading is easy to see in Dioguardi v. Durning,6 6 a case decided by Clark
following his appointment to the Second Circuit. In Dioguardi, the
plaintiff filed a pro se complaint against the New York collector of
customs. The complaint, which contained no shortage of factual detail, made clear that the plaintiff was upset over the defendant's handling of a public sale of merchandise that the plaintiff had attempted
to import from Italy. It did not, however, identify the legal basis of
the plaintiff's claim: Clark's opinion speculated that proof might reveal that the defendant was liable "for a default or for negligence in
the performance of his duties."6 7 The District Court had dismissed
the complaint but Clark reinstated Dioguardi's action, stating that
under the Federal Rules, "there is no pleading requirement of stating
'facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action."' It was enough that
"the plaintiff has disclosed his claims that the collector has converted
or otherwise done away with two of his cases of medicinal tonics."6 8
Clark also suggested that on remand, the District Court might "find
substance" in other allegations in the complaint.6 9 Thus, the complaint was adequate for purposes of notice, although it did not come
close to pleading a framework of legal issues for trial.
A point of interest about the pre-Conley pleading debate is that it
continued unabated after the adoption of the Rules. There was speculation that Rule 8 laid to rest the problematic "fact" pleading of the
Code. Detailed fact pleading, however, was not what McCaskill and
his allies were interested in defending: their point was that pleadings,
and the trials and judicial decisions that follow, should be grounded in
law. Procedural simplification was not enough to end the Clark-McCaskill debate, which concerned older, and possibly eternal, questions
about the nature and grounds of adjudication.
65. See, e.g., GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR., COLIN C. TAIT, WILLIAM A. FLETCHER & STEMcG. BUNDY, PLEADING AND PROCEDURE 546 (Foundation Press 9th ed. 2005); cf.
WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 4, at 92-94 (suggesting that a notice pleading is a misleading term
and that notice pleading differs from a fact pleading under the Code only in the degree of specificity required).
66. See 139 F.2d 774 (2d Cir. 1944) (discussing the distinction between notice pleading and
the substance of the pleading).
67. 1d. at 775.
68. Id.
69. Id.
PHEN
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II.
A.

CONLEY V. GIBSON

The Conley Litigation

In Conley v. Gibson, the Supreme Court finally put to rest the
question of pleading law. As I have noted in other publications,7'
Conley was an unusual, and perhaps inadvertent, vehicle for resolution of the debate over the role of substantive law at the pleading
stage of adjudication. The Court's opinion, however, unambiguously
endorsed notice pleading without the need to specify a legal theory of
recovery.7 '
Conley was one of a series of cases challenging discriminatory
practices by railroads and railroad unions against African-American
employees. 72 When Conley was decided, there were no federal employment discrimination laws and the Fourteenth Amendment was
not applicable to private discrimination. 73 The Supreme Court, however, began to take action against railroads (a major source of employment at the time) through creative interpretation of the Railway
Labor Act ("RLA").7 4
The RLA provided for union representation of railroad workers
for the purpose of negotiating employment contracts with the railroads.7 5 In the 1940s and 1950s, the unions, who theoretically represented both black and white workers, engaged in rampant
discrimination, apparently without opposition from the railroads.7 6 In
one Supreme Court case, for example, an all-white union had negotiated a contract provision reserving the desirable position of train fireman for white employees.7 7 Some unions excluded black employees
from membership,78 and unions that admitted black employees to
70. See EMILY SHERWIN, The Story of Conley: Precedent By Accident, in CIVIL PROCEDURE
STORIES 280, 295 (Kevin M. Clermont ed., Foundation Press 2004).
71. Id.
72. See, e.g., Bhd. of R.R. Trainmen v. Howard, 343 U.S. 768 (1952); Graham v. Bhd. of
Locomotive Firemen & Enginemen, 338 U.S. 232 (1949); Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R.R.,
323 U.S. 192 (1944); Tunstall v. Bhd. of Locomotive Firemen & Enginemen, 323 U.S. 210 (1944);
ELDER Wlr,

CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY'S GUIDE TO THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT

608 (2d ed. 1990) (describing the Railway Labor Act cases).
73. A few states had fair employment laws, but most did not. See Archibald Cox, The Duty
of FairRepresentation, 2 VILL. L. REV. 151, 156 (1957); Michael I. Sovern, The National Labor
Relations Act and Racial Discrimination,62 COLUM. L. REV. 563, 563-65 (1962).
74. Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C.A. §§ 151-163 (1996).
75. 45 U.S.C.A. § 152.
76. See Sovern, supra note 73, at 565, 567 (describing discriminatory practices).
77. See Steele, 323 U.S. at 203 (holding this practice invalid).
78. The RLA permitted unions to exclude black employees from membership. See id. at
204; Sovern, supra note 73, at 583 & n.80. However, a union elected by a majority of employees
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membership commonly maintained separate lodges for black and
white members and gave preference to the interests of the white
lodges.7 9 Segregated lodges were often coupled with union shop
clauses limiting employment to union members. The effect was that
membership in a segregated lodge became a condition of employment

for many African-American workers. 80
In 1944, the Supreme Court held that the exclusive bargaining
powers of unions under the RLA were coupled with an implied duty
of fair representation of all employees within the relevant bargaining

unit.8" Accordingly, unions negotiating employment contracts with

the railroad could not bargain for discriminatory terms, although
there was no law directly prohibiting railroads from discriminating
against black employees. On this basis, the Court ruled that the con-

tract provision, reserving the position of train fireman for white workers, was a breach of the union's duty of fair representation.82
At the time of Conley, the Court had recognized the unions' duty

of fair representation but a number of interpretive questions remained
open. Among these was whether the duty of fair representation extended beyond negotiation of contract terms to administration of existing contracts;8 3 whether the unions were required not only to
refrain from imposing inferior conditions on black employees but also
to actively promote equal conditions for all employees;8 4 and whether
unions could legitimately maintain segregated lodges. 85 The complaint in Conley raised each of these issues.

The plaintiffs in Conley were African-American employees of the
Texas and New Orleans Railroad.8 6 The complaint alleged that the
had exclusive power to negotiate labor contracts on behalf of all employees, including
nonmembers.
79. See Taylor v. Bhd. of Ry., 106 F. Supp. 438, 442-45 (D.D.C. 1952) (holding a challenge to
segregated lodges nonjusticiable).
80. 45 U.S.C.A. § 152 (providing for union shop agreements with an exemption for employees who were excluded from membership by the union).
81. Steele, 323 U.S. at 202-04.
82. Id. at 203.
83. See Dillard v. Chesapeake & 0. Ry., 199 F.2d 948 (4th Cir. 1952) (finding an enforceable duty); Hettenbaugh v. Airline Pilots Ass'n Int'l, 189 F.2d. 319 (5th Cir. 1951) (finding no
judicially enforceable duty); Hayes v. Union Pac. R.R., 184 F.2d 337 (9th Cir. 1950) (finding no
judicially enforceable duty).
84. See Cox, supra note 73, at 156-67 (opposing a duty); Sovern, supra note 73, at 577-81
(supporting a duty).
85. See, e.g., Taylor, 106 F. Supp. at 442-45.
86. The union representing the plaintiff's bargaining unit was the Brotherhood of Railway
and Steamship Clerks, Freight Handlers, Express and Station Employees. The defendants in
Conley were the union and several union officers. See Complaint at 7-9, Conley v. Gibson, 355
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plaintiffs were required by a union shop agreement to join a union,
which then placed them in a segregated lodge.8 7 It also alleged that
the union refused to prosecute a grievance for forty-five members of
88
the black lodge whom the railroad had wrongfully discharged.
Based on these allegations, plaintiffs sought damages and an injunction against the union and its officers for breach of the union's duty of
fair representation.8 9
The case began badly for the plaintiffs: a federal district court
dismissed the plaintiffs' suit on the ground that a claim based on discriminatory administration of a collective bargaining agreement fell
within the exclusive jurisdiction of the governing administrative body,
the National Railway Adjustment Board. 9° The Fifth Circuit summarily affirmed, 91 and the plaintiffs petitioned for a writ of certiorari.
Following the Court's grant of certiorari, the plaintiffs were represented by a team of African-American lawyers led by Joseph C.
Waddy, a veteran civil rights advocate and alumnus of Howard University. 92 Waddy and his associates ultimately prevailed, and the Supreme Court reversed and reinstated the suit.
Curiously, although Conley was long considered to be the definitive interpretation of Rule 8, pleading was not a significant point of
dispute between the parties. The plaintiffs' complaint was quite specific-perhaps overly soecific-in relating the series of events that led
the plaintiffs to sue. The complaint also identified with reasonable
clarity the legal questions at issue in the case. The defendants' motion
to dismiss relied primarily on jurisdictional claims, although it concluded with a perfunctory statement that the complaint failed to state
a claim on which relief could be granted. 93 The lower court decisions
U.S. 41 (1957), available at http://legall.cit.cornell.edu/kevin/civprostories/chap07/conley0l.pdf
[hereinafter Transcript].
87. See id. at 9-11.
88. See id. at 11-14.
89. Id. at 14-16.
90. Conley v. Gibson, 138 F. Supp. 60, 62-63 (S.D. Tex. 1955).
91. Conley v. Gibson, 229 F.2d 436 (5th Cir. 1956).
92. Waddy went on to become a Federal judge, as did two of his associates counsel in the
Conley litigation, Robert L. Carter and William B. Bryant. See Brownat50.org, http://
www.brownat50.org/BrownBiosfBioJudge RbtCarter.html (last visited Aug. 30, 2008); Just the
Beginning Foundation: Judge Biographies, Joseph C. Waddy, http://www.jtbf.org/index.php?src=
directory&view=biographies&srctype=dispay&refno=202&PHPSESSD=521c7a0ed2451b66e
5d55a7b8a657d2; Yvonne Shinhoster Lamb, Pioneering D.C. Judge Beat Racial Odds With Wisdom, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/11/14/AR2005111401699.htm
(last visited Aug. 30, 2008).
93. Motion to Dismiss, Conley v. Gibson, in Transcript, supra note 86, at 17-18.
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dealt only with the question of jurisdiction and made no mention of
defective pleading.
Before the Supreme Court, neither party's brief discussed or even
cited Rule 8. In their briefs and arguments to the Court, Waddy and
his associates focused on the three legal issues raised in the complaint:
(1) whether the union's duty of fair representation (and federal jurisdiction to hear the claim) extended to contract administration; (2)
whether passive behavior, such as failure to prosecute the plaintiffs'
grievance, could constitute a breach of duty; and (3) whether the
union breached its duty by confining the plaintiffs to a segregated
lodge.94 The defendants at first relied heavily on the jurisdictional argument that had persuaded the lower courts to dismiss the case.9 5
Then, following a change of heart by the Fifth Circuit on the question
of federal jurisdiction,9 6 they turned their attention to the scope of the
duty of fair representation and the problem of segregated lodges.97
Pleading played only a marginal role in the defendants' arguments. Given the procedural posture of the case, which had been dismissed at the level of pleadings, it was natural for the defendants to
refer to the plaintiffs' complaint and to argue that the complaint was
deficient. For the most part, however, the defendants discussed the
complaint in conjunction with substantive arguments about the scope
of the duty of fair representation. For example, they pointed out that
the complaint alleged only that the union had failed to act on the
plaintiffs' behalf; that it alleged only one incident (failure to prosecute
a grievance after the plaintiffs were discharged) rather than a course
of conduct; and that it did not allege that the union had negotiated for
discriminatory contract terms. 98 These were not objections to the formal sufficiency of the complaint, calling for greater specificity or further delineation of the legal issues in dispute. Instead, the contention
was simply that the plaintiffs had misinterpreted the applicable law.99
94. Petitioner's Brief at 3-4, 7-13, Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957), available at http://
legall.cit.cornell.edu/kevin/civprostories/chap07/conley04.pdf.
95. Brief of Respondents in Opposition at 10-19, Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957),
available at http://legall.cit.cornell.edu/kevin/civprostories/chap07/conley03.pdf.
96. See Richardson v. Texas & New Orleans R.R., 242 F.2d 230, 233-34 (5th Cir. 1957)
(disapproving the court's prior decision affirming dismissal of the Conley plaintiffs' complaint).
This decision was rendered between the Supreme Court's grant of certiorari in Conley and the
filing of brief on the merits.
97. Brief for Respondents Pat Gibson, et al. at 16-35, Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957)
(No. 7), 1957 WL 87662 [hereinafter Brief for Respondents].
98. See id. at 5, 13-14, 17-18, 20-22, 26-28, 31.
99. See id. at 18-19 ("In short ... we do not believe the Railway Labor Act or the Constitution exact the obligation for which Petitioners contend."). The defendants also suggested that
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One argument advanced by defendants in their brief might be
interpreted as a formal objection to the complaint: the union contended that the plaintiffs were not in a position to object to its establishment of a segregated black lodge because they did not allege in
their complaint that they had applied for membership in the white
lodge. 1°0 This, of course, was a disingenuous argument. The only reason for the existence of separate lodges was to segregate black and
white employees in the context of a union shop, and it must have been
clear to all involved that application for membership in the white
lodge would be futile. In any event, the argument does not appear to
have been intended as a foray into the pleading requirements of Rule
8. Rule 8 was not mentioned, and the thrust of the defendants' contention was that Mr. Waddy was pressing arguments before the Supreme Court that were not raised in the original complaint or decided
by the courts below. 101 In other words, the defendants' objections
were aimed primarily at the proper scope of argument on review,
rather than the sufficiency of the complaint.
In oral arguments, the defendants' lawyer repeated the claim that
the plaintiffs had failed to allege facts necessary to support their arguments before the Court, and in particular that they had failed to allege
102
that they had applied for membership in the union's white lodge.
At this point, Justice Black, who authored the opinion in Conley,
broke in with several brief remarks about "free and easy" pleading
under the Federal Rules and the possibility of amending the complaint. Apart from this exchange, both parties' arguments focused on
substantive questions relating to the scope of a union's duty of fair
representation. Thus, the only references to formal pleading defects
in the course of the Conley litigation were several rather obscure remarks about missing facts, in aid of an argument that had little if anything to do with the requirements of Rule 8.

the plaintiffs' real dispute was with the railroad, and that, consequently, the railroad was either
the proper defendant or, at least, an indispensable party to the case. See id. at 14-15.
100. Brief for Respondents, supra note 97, at 4, 12-13.
101. See id. at 6,12, 26-27 ("Because in our view .... Petitioners misstate the issues involved
in this case by making extravagant claims of racial discrimination by the Brotherhood which the
factual allegations of the complaint do not support, we believe a careful analysis of the allegations of the Complaint is required."). The brief also suggested that, in their brief to the Court,
the plaintiffs were asking for "an abstract determination of a series of racial discrimination issues
which we respectfully submit are not presented on this record." Id. at 16.
102. See Audio tape: Conley v. Gibson, Oral Arguments (second of two files), available at
http://legall.cit.cornell.edu/kevin/civprostories/.
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Accordingly, the Court's opinion, with its sweeping pronouncements about the meaning of Rule 8 and purpose of a complaint, may
have come as a surprise to the litigants. The pleading questions on
which Clark, McCaskill, and others had divided for decades were not
briefed and argued before the Court. There was no exploration of

background jurisprudential issues: certainly, neither party discussed
the impact that different pleading requirements might have on the
role of substantive law in adjudication. The most frequently cited pas-

sage of the Conley opinion, in which Justice Black announced that a
complaint should not be dismissed "unless it appears beyond doubt

that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts. .. that would entitle him to
relief" was not the product of careful deliberation, but a nearly verbatim duplication of a passage from Moore's FederalPractice (a treatise
written by a prot6g6 of Charles Clark). °3
Ironically, the Court's opinion in Conley did not address the legitimacy of segregated lodges-the issue that had elicited the defend10 4
ants' most pointed objection to the form of the plaintiffs' complaint.

Instead, the opinion simply confirmed that the union's duty of fair
representation extended to administration of collective bargaining
agreements and required the union to prosecute grievances on an
103. See Des Isles v. Evans, 200 F.2d 614, 615-16 (5th Cir. 1952) (quoting Professor Moore,
who stated that "'a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim should not be granted unless it
appears to a certainty that the plaintiff would be entitled to no relief under any state of facts
which could be proved in support of his claim."'). Because Professor Moore's statement appeared in a loose leaf service, it is not possible to pinpoint the date of the statement, but it is fair
to assume it still appeared in the treatise at the time of the Conley decision. It is interesting to
note that Justice Black, who was seventy-one at the time of Conley, had remarried just one
month before the oral arguments in the case. His biographer reports that he spent less time than
usual at the Court during this period, and had taken to self-administering shots of testosterone.
This, together with the Justice's evident annoyance with the Conley defendants, might explain
the rather hasty look of the opinion.
104. It was reasonably clear that Congress intended that unions could exclude black employees from their membership, provided only that they could not both deny membership and insist
on enforcement of a union shop agreement that would prevent the employer from hiring black
workers. See H.R. Rep. No. 81-2811, at 5 (1950), reprinted in 1950 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4319, 4319; S.
Rep. No. 81-2262, at 3-4 (1950), reprinted in 1950 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4319, 4319; Steele, 323 U.S. at
204 (noting that the RLA "statute does not deny [a union] ... the right to determine eligibility to
its membership"); Michael I. Sovern, The National Labor Relations Act and Racial Discrimination, 62 COLUM. L. REV. 563, 583 & n.80 (discussing the legislative history of the RLA). The
Conley defendants also pointed to a proposed amendment to the RLA denying statutory privileges to unions who maintained segregated lodges, which was rejected in the House and Senate
committees. Brief for Respondents, supra note 97, at 23 (citing Hearings before H. Comm. on
Interstate and Foreign Commerce on H.R. 7789, 81st Cong. 285-86, 294-95 (1950)); Railway Labor Act Amendments: Hearing on S. 3295 Before the S. Subcomm. of the Comm. on Labor and
Public Welfare, 81st Cong. 244-45, 301-02 (1950). As a result, the Court may have preferred to
avoid this issue rather than to battle with Congress.
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equal basis for all employees. °5 In light of the minimal treatment of
pleading in the parties' briefs and arguments, and the Court's limited
discussion of substantive issues-which stayed well within the allegations set out in the complaint-just why Justice Black decided to
opine so emphatically on the requirements of Rule 8 remains a
mystery.
Had the Court taken on the segregation issue, Justice Black's reference to notice pleading might have been pertinent as a response to
the defendants' arguments about the allowable scope of review. Traditionally, a party appealing an adverse decision must confine his or
her arguments to the legal issues decided by the courts below. 10 6 By
extension, it would seem that a plaintiff who appeals a judgment of
dismissal for failure to state a claim cannot rely on a theory of recovery that differs markedly from whatever theories the plaintiff pursued
in the lower court. Suppose, however, that the plaintiff files a complaint that, consistent with notice pleading, contains only a brief narrative of the events that led to the suit. The lower court responds by
dismissing the complaint and the plaintiff appeals. If the complaint is
not required to set out a theory of recovery, but only to give notice of
a set of facts that might support recovery, there is no obvious reason
why the plaintiff could not submit any applicable theory of recovery
on appeal, or why the appellate court could not construct a theory of
its own. In other words, if the plaintiff's position before the lower
court was simply that there might be some legal ground for relief; a
theory presented for the first time on appeal does alter the case
presented to the lower court. Thus, for example, if Dioguardi, the
angry importer of Italian medicinal tonic,1" 7 hired a lawyer to appeal
the dismissal of his claim, that lawyer might argue before the appellate
court that the customs collector was negligent in conducting the auction of Dioguardi's goods, or that he breached a contract with Dioguardi, or that he committed any other wrong consistent with the
narrative presented in Dioguardi's complaint. Of course, Conley has
never been read this way, because the opinion does not explain this
aspect of the defendants' objection and does not refer to the scope of
review.

105. Conley, 355 U.S. at 45-47 (confirming that a fair representation claim was within the
jurisdiction of the federal courts).
106. See FIELD, KAPLAN & CLERMONT, supra note 6, at 1563.
107. See supra text accompanying notes 66-69.
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B.

Aftermath of Conley

The Court's decision in Conley settled the requirements for a
valid complaint, at least as they pertain to identification of legal issues.
A complaint must give notice of the events under dispute, but it need
not set out a substantive theory of recovery. Only if the allegations in
the complaint eliminate the possibility of recovery will the complaint
fail on legal grounds. After Conley, therefore, plaintiffs could present
their stories to the court as Charles Clark had hoped; and courts were
free, at least procedurally, to grant whatever relief they believed was
warranted by the stories brought before them.'0 8
The ,herbal formula Justice Black set out in Conley is no longer
the reigning interpretation of Rule 8. In any event, Black's formula
probably had a far greater effect on the factual contents of complaints
than on the legal structure and contents of complaints. For reasons of
custom and expedience, lawyers usually organize complaints around
theories of law, whether or not a legal theory is necessary to withstand
a motion to dismiss.'0 9 Theoretically, however, the decision in Conley
worked a major change, which is likely to be permanent. The position
that Oliver McCaskill and others maintained so vigorously, that a successful lawsuit must conform from the outset to a fairly detailed substantive theory of law, quickly vanished from sight.
In current discussions, pleading requirements are viewed as a
gatekeeping device-a device that, for better or worse, keeps factually
unsupported claims out of court. The focus on gatekeeping is a product of modern litigation conditions, augmented, perhaps, by the loose
language used in Conley. The older debate over pleading assigned a
different function to pleading, as means of imposing legal discipline on
adjudication of disputes. In the post-Conley era, the legal function of
pleading has long been forgotten. The jurisprudential questions that
lie behind it, however, inhere in any legal system.
108. See generally Conley, 355 U.S. 41 (proposing that the sufficiency of the complaint was
not an important point of contention between the parties because the only argument directed to
the form of the complaint was primarily an argument about the scope of permissible appellate
review). Interestingly, if the Court's opinion had focused on the scope of review rather than the
requirements of Rule 8, the Conley decision might still have some bearing on the relationship
between adjudication and substantive law. If a complaint is required only to apprise the defendant of the events in dispute, it will have less influence on the arguments the plaintiff can raise
on appeal if the complaint is dismissed. Thus, liberal pleading rules might facilitate judicial discretion and innovation in a different way, at the level of appellate review.
109. See Hannon, supra note 56, at 128 (suggesting that lawyers commonly exceed the requirements of Rule 8).
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III.

CONCLUSION: PLEADING RULES AND CIVIL RIGHTS

I have suggested that the academic debate over pleading that preceded Conley v. Gibson was not about the quantity, specificity, or
plausibility of the facts a plaintiff must set out in a complaint, but
about the extent to which a complaint must propose a theory of recovery, based on existing law or some reasonable interpretation of existing law. I have also suggested that, understood in this way, the preConley pleading debate reflected a difference of opinion about the
role of judges in adjudicating disputes. Traditionalists believed that
judges should resolve disputes by reference to established rules of law;
Legal Realists believed that judges should do justice in response to the
facts before them. Conley v. Gibson was a notable victory for the Legal Realist point of view.
This is not to say that the Court's brief remarks on the subject of
pleading in Conley brought an end to the rule of law in American
courts or set the courts on a course of unbridled discretion and activism. Judicial attention to legal rules is more likely to depend on professional habits and training, or on broader social norms, than on the
rules of pleading. Meanwhile, as noted, lawyers continue to structure
complaints around theories of law. 110 Nevertheless, the looser, narrative form of pleading endorsed in Conley may contribute, at least marginally, to the willingness of our judges to give relief in response to
compelling facts, case-by-case, according to their own best judgment
of what is fair and just.
A requirement that plaintiffs must fit their suits within prescribed
categories of actions (along the lines suggested by McCaskill) seems
completely outmoded today. Yet, it is conceivable that pleading rules
could require more substantive foundation for legal actions than is
now thought necessary under Rule 8. It is also conceivable that a rule
requiring more substantive legal foundation for complaints might result in a closer connection between established rules of substantive
law and the conduct and outcome of trials. If so, what implications
might stricter pleading rules have for civil rights litigation? t '
110. See Hannon, supra note 56.
111. In an empirical study of pleading before and after the Supreme Court's decision in
Twombly, Kendall Hannon found that, although the overall rate of dismissal of complaints in
federal courts has not changed markedly since Twombly, there has been a steep increase in
dismissals of civil rights complaints (defined as actions brought under §§ 1981, 1982, 1983, and
1985 of Title 42 of the United States Code). Hannon, supra note 56, at 123-33 (suggesting three
possible explanations for these results: First, the new, stricter pleading the Court adopted in
Twombly standard may have had little impact outside the area of civil rights because lawyers
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The relationship between rule-governed decision-making and
civil rights is a complex problem. Empirical testing is difficult, and
armchair analysis is likely to be affected by the political and theoretical assumptions of the analyst. The easiest answer is a skeptical answer, that legal rules are incapable of governing judicial decisionmaking. The Legal Realists of the 1930s, for example, might have argued that legally defined civil rights are meaningless because the rules
that define them are too malleable to constrain the outcomes of particular disputes.1 1 2 Another skeptical position, associated with more
recent critical scholarship, holds that legally defined rights not only
are illusory, but also have the malign effect of perpetuating current
distributions of social power.1 1 3 If these views are correct, it follows
either that the choice of pleading rules is of no consequence, or that
liberal pleading is healthy because it eliminates a pointless source of
distraction.
If, on the other hand, legal rules are capable of determining the
outcome of judicial decisions, then Stephen Subrin's assessment seems
correct: in a fundamentally equitable procedural system such as ours,
courts will be very good at creating rights but less good at enforcing
them." 4 Adjudication according to rules stabilizes established rights
but makes it harder for courts to expand rights beyond the terms of
the rules that currently define them. A more open-ended, discretionary mode of adjudication permits judges to innovate but can also enable particular judges to disregard claims of right they do not find
were already including more detailed allegations than Conley required. In civil rights cases,
however, lawyers may not have exceeded the Conley standard, either because the necessary facts
are harder to detect or because plaintiffs cannot afford high-quality representation. Second, the
new plausibility gives judges more discretion over dismissal of complaints than Conley, which
strictly limited the ability of judges to dismiss at the stage of pleading. Outside the area of civil
rights, judges may have responded by continuing to give minimal scrutiny to complaints. In civil
rights cases, however, courts may have used their new discretion to increase scrutiny of complaints, out of concern for the burdens that potential liability places on government actors. Finally, lower federal courts may have begun to impose higher pleading standards, presumably in
non-civil-rights cases, prior to Twombly).
Because the Twombly standard pertains to the level of factual support required in a complaint, rather than the legal foundation for claims, Hannon's data are not directly relevant to the
question posed in the text, which asks what implications a stricter test of the legal content of
pleadings might have for civil rights litigation. However, two points Hannon mentions in his
analysis might bear on my inquiry. If in fact civil rights plaintiffs have difficulty obtaining highquality representation, their complaints might be more likely to suffer from legal defects than
complaints in other types of litigation. Further, a standard requiring more legal foundation for
claims might, as a practical matter, give courts more leeway to disfavor civil rights claims.
112. See supra text accompanying note 40.
113. See Mack, supra note 10, at 259-60 (discussing Critical Legal Studies scholarship on the
topic of civil rights and citing examples).
114. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
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persuasive. Accordingly, a pleading regime that focuses litigation on
established rights (or modest adjustments to established rights) may
slow the development of new rights, but may also provide the most
reliable structure for enforcement of rights.
Some have suggested that judicial decisions establishing or extending civil rights are unlikely to affect social behavior unless and
until they are accepted by the public; therefore, civil rights laws enacted by democratically elected legislatures may have a greater practical effect than adjudication on the well-being of rightholders." 5 If this
view is correct, then judicial innovation in favor of civil rights may be
ineffectual, while judicial resistance to civil rights could delay implementation of rights that have gained popular support. As a result, the
risks of judicial discretion may outweigh the benefits of discretion. In
this regard, it is interesting to note that the first calls for equitable
reform of the Field Code came from business advocates who hoped
that a strong and relatively unrestrained judiciary would resist legislative attempts to regulate economic activity.16
A middle ground, in which judges are attentive to legally defined
rights but willing on occasion to look beyond established rules, may be
optimal for protection of civil rights. Ordinarily, compromises between formality and unconstrained decision-making are not logically
possible: a rule that is subject to exception or modification, either to
further the underlying rationale of the rule or in response to compelling circumstances, loses its power to constrain.1 17 Procedural mechanisms, however, have some promise as a way to achieve a compromise
between rules and discretion, because they operate indirectly. The
process of adjudication can be structured in ways that make it more or
less likely that judges will approach a dispute with rules of positive law
in mind-for example, by providing for rule-oriented pleading at the
outset of the case.
115. See, e.g., GERALD ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT SO39-169 (University of Chicago Press 1991); Michael J. Klarman, Brown, Racial
Change, and the Civil Rights Movement, 80 VA. L. REV. 7, 8-13 (1994); see also Mack, supra note
10, at 346-51 (describing civil rights lawyers' views of the functions of litigation during the 1930s
and 1940s); cf. Davison M. Douglas, The Limits of Law in Accomplishing Racial Change: School
Segregation in the Pre-Brown North, 44 UCLA L. REV. 677, 678-84 (1997) (suggesting that legislation may not be effective if it does not reflect a sufficient, cross-racial convergence of opinion).
116. See Subrin, supra note 16, at 948-55 (discussing Thomas Shelton and other supporters of
the Rules Enabling Act).
117. For extensive analysis of why this is true, see LARRY ALEXANDER & EMILY SHERWIN,
THE RULE OF RULES: MORALITY, RULES, AND THE DILEMMAS OF LAW 53-95 (2001); FREDERCIAL CHANGE?

ICK SCHAUER, PLAYING BY THE RULES:
CISION-MAKING IN LIFE AND LAW

A

PHILOSOPHICAL EXAMINATION OF RULE-BASED DE-

128-34 (Oxford: Clarendon Press 1991).
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A return to mandatory issue pleading is highly unlikely, and
probably undesirable, in modern times. Nevertheless, as long as lawyers persist in the habit of outlining a legal theory of recovery in their
complaints, it is possible that lingering pleading practices may help to
preserve the integrity of rights, without unduly restricting the development of rights.
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